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Mechanisms design has traditionally been a manual endeavor.  In 2002, Conitzer and Sandholm 
introduced the automated mechanism design (AMD) approach, where the mechanism is 
computationally created for the specific problem instance at hand. This has several advantages: 1) it 
can yield better mechanisms than the ones known to date, 2) it applies beyond the problem classes 
studied manually to date, 3) it can circumvent seminal economic impossibility results that hold for 
classes of problems but not all instances, and 4) it shifts the burden of design from man to machine.  
In this talk I will overview our results on AMD to date.  I will cover problem representations and 
the computational complexity of different variants of the design problem.  Initial applications 
include revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions and (combinatorial) public goods problems.  
Algorithms for AMD will be discussed.  To reduce the computational complexity of designing 
optimal combinatorial auctions, I introduce an incentive compatible, individually rational subfamily 
called Virtual Valuations Combinatorial Auctions.  The auction mechanism's revenue can be 
boosted (started, for example, from the VCG) by hill-climbing in this subspace.  I will also present 
computational complexity and communication complexity results that motivate multi-stage and 
non-truth-promoting mechanisms.  Finally, I present our first steps toward automatically designing 
multi-stage mechanisms. 
 
Our work on automated mechanism design is covered in the following papers, and the talk presents 
selected results from them: 
 
Early overview 
o Sandholm, T. 2003.   Automated mechanism design:  A New Application Area for Search 
Algorithms.  In Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles and Practice of 
Constraint Programming (CP).  Paper corresponding to an invited talk.  (The review part is 
about joint research with Vincent Conitzer.)  
Research on the general problem 
o Conitzer, V. and Sandholm, T. 2004.  Self-Interested Automated Mechanism Design and 
Implications for Optimal Combinatorial Auctions.  In Proceedings of the ACM Conference 
on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC), pp. 132-141.  
o Conitzer, V. and Sandholm, T. 2004. An Algorithm for Automatically Designing 
Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments.  In Proceedings of the International Joint 
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pp. 128-135, New 
York, July 19-23.  Early version appeared in Proceedings of the IJCAI-03 Workshop on 
Distributed Constraint Reasoning, Acapulco, Mexico.  
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o Conitzer, V. and Sandholm, T. 2003.  Applications of automated mechanism design. In 
Proceedings of the UAI Bayesian Modeling Applications Workshop, Acapulco, Mexico.  
Extended version.  
o Conitzer, V. and Sandholm, T. 2003.  Automated mechanism design with a structured 
outcome space.  Draft.  
o Conitzer, V. and Sandholm, T. 2002. Complexity of Mechanism Design. In Proceedings of 
the 18th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI), August 1-4, Edmonton, 
Canada.  
o Conitzer, V. and Sandholm, T. 2003.  Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results 
Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting. In Proceedings of the International Conference 
on Electronic Commerce (ICEC), Pittsburgh, September 30 – October 3.  
Specialized techniques for combinatorial auctions, auctions, and other selling mechanisms 
o Likhodedov, A. and Sandholm, T. 2005.  Approximating Revenue-Maximizing 
Combinatorial Auctions. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence (AAAI), Pittsburgh, PA. 
o Likhodedov, A. and Sandholm, T. 2004.  Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial 
Auctions.  In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pp. 
232-237, San Jose, California.  
o Sandholm, T. and Gilpin, A. 2003. Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal 
Auctions without Full Valuation Revelation.  In Proceedings of the AAMAS workshop on 
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC V), Melbourne, Australia.  
o Likhodedov, A. and Sandholm, T. 2004.  Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue 
and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctions. Short paper in proceedings of  the ACM Conference 
on Electronic Commerce.  Extended version.  (Early version in Proceedings of the AAMAS 
workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce (AMEC V), Melbourne, Australia, 
2003.)  
 
